External Facets of Justice, Freedom and Security by Mawdsley J
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Mawdsley J. External Facets of Justice, Freedom and Security. In: Hadfield, A; 
Manners, I; Whitman, R, ed. Foreign Policies of EU Member States: Continuity 
and Europeanisation. London, UK: Routledge, 2017, pp.218-231. 
Copyright: 
This is the authors’ accepted manuscript of a book chapter that has been published in its final 
definitive form by Routledge, 2017 
Link to book: 
https://www.routledge.com/Foreign-Policies-of-EU-Member-States-Continuity-and-
Europeanisation/Hadfield-Manners-Whitman/p/book/9780415670067  
Date deposited:   
02/08/2017 
Embargo release date: 
09 December 2018  
1 
 
External Facets of Justice, Freedom and Security 
Jocelyn Mawdsley 
[A] Introduction 
In the last decade the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) has been the most dynamic 
field of European integration (Wolff, 2008). Encompassing the policy areas of police, customs 
and judicial cooperation, EU citizenship, border control, immigration, asylum, combatting 
discrimination and the fight against terrorism, organized crime, drug-trafficking and human-
trafficking, the AFSJ has developed rapidly in terms of policy areas, institutional complexity 
and legislation. Its external dimension has also expanded quickly, because the EU’s internal 
security objectives can only be achieved through cooperation with third states. Both the refugee 
crisis stemming from conflicts in the Middle East and terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels 
meant that by 2016 the external aspects of the EU’s AFSJ have become major challenges for 
the EU. However, rather than being a strongly Europeanized external policy, the reality is more 
nuanced and highly politicized. The chapter aims to answer two main questions: 
 What is the dominant mode of member state cooperation in this area and is this 
changing? 
 Is the external dimension of the AFSJ becoming more Europeanized or more 
nationalized over time? 
This introductory section will briefly explain the division of competences in the AFSJ, and 
outline the institutional complexity of its governance, before introducing some of the tensions 
that feature in its policy-making. 
Until the Treaty of Amsterdam, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA) was 
intergovernmental in what was known as the JHA pillar, with little involvement of the other 
EU institutions. The Treaty of Amsterdam moved the areas of asylum, immigration and judicial 
cooperation in civil matters into the Community pillar, but everything else remained in the 
intergovernmental JHA pillar. Policy-making was largely carried out through multiannual 
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programmes, whose parameters were set by the European Council, and the Commission was 
tasked with proposing implementation measures. The Lisbon Treaty removed the JHA pillar, 
meaning the AFSJ is now subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, and should have 
heralded changes in policy-making dynamics. Indeed Kaunert (2010) has pointed to the 
importance the Commission granted to securing the changes in both the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, and the subsequent treaty negotiations, as evidence of Commission policy 
entrepreneurialism in this policy area.  
However, there are some important limitations. The AFSJ remains an area of shared 
competence, meaning that Member States retain the right to exercise their legislative 
prerogative where full harmonization has yet to occur (i.e. in almost all AFSJ areas). States 
therefore can and do, continue to conclude agreements on issues related to the external 
dimension of the AFSJ. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty does not give any general competence 
for the EU to act in external AFSJ affairs (Monar, 2012). Since the Lisbon Treaty came into 
force there is also evidence of the Member States in the Council trying to reassert their 
prerogative to set the contours of the policy against the will of the Commission (Carrera and 
Guild, 2012). However, the conflict between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism is not 
the only tension. 
The policy area is not just legally but also institutionally complex. Within the EU institutions 
the portfolio is divided between several Commission Directorates-General along with 
specialized agencies like Frontex and Europol. Each has its own institutional priorities and 
these do not always match, meaning that a unified position can be challenging to find. These 
internal Commission tensions are mirrored by disagreement between the European Parliament 
and the Commission and Council, on the correct balance between security and freedom, with 
the Parliament sometimes (if inconsistently) taking a more liberal human rights-based 
approach. 
3 
 
Monar (2012) argues that the diversity of complex and politically sensitive areas covered by 
the AFSJ makes it unlikely to develop into a unified EU external policy1. It also means 
integration dynamics vary within AFSJ external policies. Broadly speaking however, we can 
differentiate between the dynamics in border and migration control on the one hand, and 
counter-terrorism on the other. While both policy areas have evolved largely in response to 
external events, they have done so in different ways. This offers an organizational logic for this 
chapter, so after offering a brief outline of the evolution of the external dimension of the AFSJ 
and an overview of member states’ positions, the chapter will examine the integration dynamics 
of external policies on border and migration control, and on counter-terrorism.  
 
[A] Context: Integration in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
 
Until the ratification of the Single European Act, European integration was largely based on 
the concept of removing economic and legal barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and people. The removal of internal borders, however, meant that the security of EU 
citizens became dependent upon the control of the EU’s external borders, while simultaneously 
ensuring that the removal of internal borders was not abused. Huysmans (2000) suggests that 
this linking of external and internal borders marked the transformation of the Single Market 
from a socio-economic project into an internal security project encompassing the wider Union. 
Certainly, the emphasis on protecting external borders means there has been an external 
dimension to JHA cooperation from the outset, and from the Hague Programme onwards (if 
not earlier) this can be reasonably described as having a security focus. The intensification of 
the refugee crisis from 2015 onwards, coupled with terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and 
Brussels in 2016, has further strengthened security fears, leading to some states unilaterally 
reintroducing national border controls within the Schengen area. 
4 
 
 
 [B] Evolution of the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice  
Although for scholars like  Balzacq (2009) there is earlier evidence of an external dimension 
to JHA cooperation2, according to Wessel, Marin and Matera (2011) three events have shaped 
the development of the external dimension of the AFSJ:  
1. the 1999 Tampere summit,  
2. the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US  
3. and the 2004 Hague Programme.  
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty stated that the EU should work internationally on JHA concerns, 
and the changes in this treaty enabled the 1999 Tampere extraordinary European Council 
Summit conclusions, which for the first time clearly articulated the link between the EU’s 
internal security policies and external relations, and stated that all EU external relations 
instruments should be used to build the AFSJ (European Council, 1999). This marked the start 
of a policy-making mode whereby the AFSJ policy objectives were set out in multiannual 
programmes by the European Council. At the follow-up June 2000 Feira Summit, the European 
Council agreed to give priority to “external migration policy, the fight against organized crime 
and terrorism, against specific forms of crime, drug-trafficking, and the development and 
consolidation of the rule of law in countries on the road to democracy” (Wessel, Marin and 
Matera, 2011: 281). This set the overall direction of the external dimension of the AFSJ.  
The second key event was the 9/11 attacks, which focussed attention not just on counter-
terrorism but on external cooperation with the United States. This cooperation has led to 
unprecedented agreements on data sharing for example, but also more generally to the 
elaboration of cooperation with third states on counter-terrorism; an area where the tensions 
between freedom and security are at their strongest. It has meant that security concerns have 
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played an even more prominent role in shaping the external dimension of the AFSJ than might 
have been the case.  
Finally, the Hague Programme, agreed in 2004, saw the adoption by the European Council of 
a coherent strategy on the external dimension of JHA in 2005, which set the parameters for this 
field (Council of the EU, 2005). This strategy made it clear that the primary objective of EU 
engagement with third countries is the fulfilment of the needs of EU citizens, conceived 
primarily in terms of security.  
 
[A] Member States: The Stockholm Programme and Beyond 
The Stockholm Programme was the most recent iteration of the full AFSJ programmes. 
Entitled ‘An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens’. The Stockholm 
Programme stated that external action should concentrate on five areas of action: migration and 
asylum; security; information exchange; justice and civil protection and disaster management 
(European Council, 2010).  It was an ambitious document reflecting the ‘depillarization’ of the 
ASFJ in the Lisbon Treaty. However, it was also noticeable that the Stockholm Programme 
was substantially based on the 2008 member state dominated Future Group report, showing the 
continuation of intergovernmentalism prevailing at the policy framing stage of AFSJ. While 
certain states were very active in framing the Stockholm Programme – the Future Group 
included the first three trio presidencies of the programming period:  Germany, Portugal, 
Slovenia; France, Czech Republic, Sweden; Spain, Belgium, Hungary: along with the UK as a 
common law observer – this did not mean these states consistently supported Europeanization 
in all of the agreed areas of action. In fact, the intensely politicized nature of the policy area 
means that member states are inconsistent in their support or opposition, and often develop 
their positions based on national politics or recent events. This also means that a Member State 
might be classified as a laggard in one area, while being a champion of further integration in 
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others. Even formal treaty status is not helpful. For example, the UK is one of the more active 
member states on the external dimension of the AFSJ, but like Denmark and Ireland has a 
formal treaty opt-out from AFSJ, although the UK and Ireland can choose to opt-in on a case-
by-case basis. 
The implementation of the ambitious Stockholm programme was therefore not straightforward. 
As argued above positions in the Council fluctuated in response to recent events, but as Carrera 
and Guild (2012) point out that both the European Commission and the Parliament developed 
also specific alternative agendas, leading to a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping 
strategies, agendas and legislative proposals. Although less ambitious framework guidelines 
were adopted in 2014 for the current programming period with the idea that ‘less is more’, they 
too have been overtaken by events, notably the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Paris 
and Brussels.  
Rather than a straightforward picture of Europeanization envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, the 
AFSJ currently represents a confused and conflicted policy agenda, with tensions over power 
and policy direction. It is therefore difficult to make an overall assessment of the policy-making 
dynamics and whether for the Member States the policy is becoming more Europeanized or 
nationalized. Moreover, within the policy area the integration dynamics are differentiated 
between the policy areas subsumed under the external dimension of AFSJ. This chapter now 
will look at two key but differing policy areas: border and migration control and counter-
terrorism and internal security: to assess whether any trends can be identified. 
 
[A] Border and Migration Control: Policy Change 
While its inadequacies have been made clear by the worsening of the refugee crisis from 2015 
onwards, the 2008 European Pact on Asylum and Migration still forms the centrepiece of EU 
cooperation on asylum and migration. It represents not just a highly successful uploading by 
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the French EU presidency of French norms and concerns, but also, as Kostakopoulou (2009) 
argues, the continuing power of the Member States to frame the issue of migration, and thus 
cooperation with third states, through their national concerns. Domestic political sensitivity 
about immigration is a key political issue in most Member States, and so there is a reluctance 
to cede sovereignty on migration including cooperation with third states. It is difficult to portray 
the area of border management and migration control as other than largely characterized by 
intergovernmental dynamics (both Mode II and Mode IV). 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Commission has tried to establish 
a series of narratives to enable the Europeanization of the policy area, however this has not 
been wholly successful. Kaunert (2009) for example suggests that the European Commission 
has acted as a norm entrepreneur on immigration, moving away from further securitization of 
asylum policy and instead focusing on adhering to international law. Their more successful 
narrative has been around framing external border security as a technological problem, which 
has permitted the growth of supranational border surveillance. While the EU border 
management agency, Frontex, established in 2004, reflects an uneasy compromise between the 
European Commission’s preference for an EU border guard and member states’ reluctance, the 
agreement on a European border surveillance system (EUROSUR), represents a supranational 
advance, underpinned by the Commission’s growing role in the research and development of 
surveillance technologies. On the whole though, this has been the exception rather than the 
rule. 
Most recently the dynamics of third country cooperation have been dominated by the rhetoric 
of emergency, which has strengthened the intergovernmental logic and indeed meant a return 
to mode IV activity. In responding to the developing refugee crisis in 2015-16, member states 
have been more enthusiastic about cooperating through intergovernmental policies like the 
CSDP or non-EU bodies like NATO than they have on proposals that would deepen European 
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integration. Here both mode II and IV dynamics can be observed. Since May 2015, 
EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA has been working in the Southern Central 
Mediterranean to deter people traffickers, stem flows of illegal migration and prevent deaths at 
sea. Ardittis (2016) claims that the Council now hopes to deploy a civilian security mission to 
improve Libyan police, border forces and counter-terrorism operations in a further example of 
Mode II policy action. NATO also agreed to deploy its fleet in the Aegean Sea in February 
2016 to deter people trafficking – this decision is thought to have come at the request of 
Germany and Turkey, following bilateral meetings (Zhukov, 2016), showing an example of 
mode IV policy action. Similarly, the highly controversial 2016 EU-Turkey deal on the 
exchange of irregular migrants for refugees, was driven by German-Turkish bilateral 
negotiations (Kim, 2016). While it is tempting to see these dynamics as emergency responses, 
or perhaps a symptom of German hegemony in the EU, in fact they conform well to general 
trends about EU states’ behaviour as the next section will show. 
 
[A] Border and Migration Control Policy Performance: Action and Change 
Although EU external border management policy is intended to be built on principles of 
burden-sharing and solidarity, in reality it is characterized by individual Member States 
attempting to upload migration emergencies causing domestic political tension to the EU level 
(intergovernmental Europeanization - Mode II), while non-affected Member States resist. 
However, this does not mean that states can be consistently identified as laggards or leaders as 
flows of migration, locations of most asylum claims, and national responses (such as tightening 
of immigration legislation or closing of borders) vary over time. While this pattern has been at 
its most acute from 2015 onwards, it is not new. As Chou (2009) points out Germany attempted 
to upload its domestic problems with refugees from the Balkans conflicts in the early 1990s 
but met with resistance, and then turned into a laggard, blocking attempts to Europeanize 
9 
 
asylum policy (Hellmann et al., 2005) but then in 2015 when its unilateral decision to suspend 
the Dublin regulation led to over 1 million asylum seekers entering Germany, it favoured 
compulsory quotas for all member states. Migration routes also vary meaning that the third 
countries that the EU and its member states must negotiate with change. For example, in 2015 
attention shifted from the central Mediterranean route (Libya to Italy / Malta) to the Eastern 
Mediterranean route (Turkey to Greece) as the numbers using the latter increased exponentially 
meaning that a previous focus on agreements with Libya shifted to Turkey. 
[B] Figure 1: Major Refugee Routes to Europe 
 
Source: Deutsche Welle / Frontex 
Until the refugee crisis intensified in 2015, and more states were drawn in, either as transit 
states or final destinations, migration flows were concentrated on Southern European states 
bordering the Mediterranean, and the situation for some time had been encapsulated by a North-
South divide (Wolff, 2008)3. Bremberg and Britz (2009) suggest that more generally in internal 
security matters, there is a divide between Southern member states, which are in favour of 
greater supranationalization (and thus in particular burden-sharing in the form of financial and 
technical assistance), and Northern member states that are opposed. For the Mediterranean 
states badly impacted by the financial crisis, their new internal security problems especially 
those connected to immigration, are an additional expense that they are ill-prepared to deal 
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with, so some supranational proposals that would make all EU states share the burden are 
attractive, however here too there is resistance to ceding sovereignty. The 2015 intensification 
of the refugee crisis has also brought a new line of tension with many Central and Eastern 
European states stating outright opposition to any communitarization of individual states’ 
migration problems and particularly rejecting national quotas for refugees (Hampshire, 2015). 
 
While solidarity between EU states during migration emergencies remains low, there is some 
evidence that in calmer times, states do have some success in uploading their national concerns 
to the EU level. The example of the French presidency shaping the 2008 European Pact on 
Asylum and Migration has already been given. Southern EU states for example have also 
enjoyed a degree of success in Europeanising their national concerns. The 2002 Spanish 
Presidency was able to upload its domestic concerns about combatting drug-trafficking and 
immigration from Morocco, and to get agreement on the externalization of JHA policy in the 
Mediterranean. Since then, Wolff (2008) argues, Frontex activity has taken on a distinctly 
Mediterranean focus, due to continued intense pressure from EU Southern Member States. 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Italy are periodically confronted by waves of 
migration from Africa, with which they are poorly equipped to cope. Wolff further points out 
that coordinated missions to counter illegal migration both prior to, and since the establishment 
of Frontex, have been concentrated on this region, and policy has accordingly been made in 
response to Southern European concerns (Wolff, 2008). Here we can observe a degree of 
intergovernmentally fostered Europeanization (mode 2). Klepp (2008) for example suggests 
that Southern EU Member States  ʻon different levels [...] are remodelling the EU-refugee 
regime through their “frontline perspective”, pressuring for their positions in European 
decision-making forums and formalizing informal practices established in the border regionsʼ 
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(Klepp, 2008; 19). Here too though despite some mode 2 Europeanization what can be 
observed is a policy being driven by crises rather than forward planning.  
Paradoxically moreover, frontline states like Italy, Spain or Malta have been engaging in 
Europeanization by uploading their immigration, asylum and border management concerns to 
the EU level, while simultaneously developing bilateral relationships with North African and 
Middle East states on migration control, like the agreements between Italy and Libya signed in 
2003 and 2007 (Wolff, 2010). Here we can observe the continuation of extra-EU policy 
relations (Mode IV) despite the presence of Europeanization through intergovernmental 
activism (Mode II). In this sense too, the national interest appears to remain paramount. 
The European Commission has been endeavouring to foster enthusiasm for greater 
Europeanization through the provision of technical and financial assistance. EU states can 
apply for financial assistance from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which 
aims inter alia to offer financial solidarity to those Member States, most affected by migration 
and asylum flows. In the budgetary cycle for 2014-20, the Commission has also established an 
Internal Security Fund: Borders and Visas with funding of €2.76 billion, to assist in these 
aspects of the implementation of the internal security strategy.4 This would cover all aspects of 
border surveillance for Schengen states. 
Moreover the Commission has also attempted to frame border management as a collective 
technological challenge. Given that even the most resistant sates accept the external border is 
only as strong as the weakest EU state’s controls, this has met with some success. Since 2003 
the Commission has been financing the development of internal security technologies, 
particularly surveillance technologies, through first a preparatory programme, then the Seventh 
Framework Programme and now Horizon 2020. Edler and James (2012) regard this action as 
evidence that the Commission can act as a supranational policy entrepreneur in this field, as 
they had no initial buy-in from any of the other actors concerned. In 2011 Frontex was given 
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the right to directly procure border surveillance equipment, which could create a more 
integrated, supranational dimension to external border control although its budget is small 
(European Union, 2011).  A communiqué on security industry also made it clear that the 
Commission intended the Internal Security Fund to fund testing and validation of such 
technologies (European Commission, 2012). The motivation for this focus on surveillance 
technologies is clearly linked to the new EUROSUR border surveillance system. In this sense 
there is some evidence of the European Commission being able to leverage a more 
supranational dimension to border management through the use of existing communitarized 
policies such as research and development policy. It has also enabled it to present the highly 
political EUROSUR project as a primarily technical one. 
The EUROSUR project has a substantial external element involving the externalization of EU 
external borders. The use of EU funding to provide border control technology to third states is 
not new. The Seahorse network involving Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Mauritania, Cape Verde, 
Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia for example has been running since 2006, funded 
substantially by the Commission’s framework for asylum and migration cooperation with third 
states. The initiative proposed and partially funded by Spain is based around a satellite-based 
communications network to share information on migrant movements. Here we can observe a 
degree of Europeanization, even if Spain and Portugal’s leadership was driven by a desire to 
access EU funding to deal with a national problem. Similar networks exist in the Baltic and 
Black Seas with both EU and non-EU participants, and Spain has proposed a further one for 
the Mediterranean. EUROSUR, which would mark an increased supranationalization of border 
control policy, would bring these networks together, thus bringing the EU more firmly into 
these regional arrangements. Frontex would be responsible for surveillance of the ‘pre-frontier’ 
area and third countries would be supplied with the necessary technologies (backed up by the 
use of EU unmanned aerial vehicles) to attempt to ensure that potential migrants cannot reach 
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EU territorial waters (European Commission, 2008).  However, it is not clear that this is 
compatible with international law. Moreover, the sale or provision of surveillance technologies 
to governments with problematic human rights records raises difficult ethical questions (Wolff, 
2008; Mawdsley, 2013). Finally, the credibility of this technological solution seems in question 
given the extent of the current refugee crisis. 
To summarize this section, the external element of border management policy reveals a 
confusing set of integration dynamics. Firstly, a general conclusion can be made that the policy 
area is predominantly marked by intergovernmental decision-making within the EU 
framework so mode two (intra-EU cooperation) in the analytical structure of this book, 
although the refugee crisis has shown some evidence of wholly uncoordinated national activity. 
Secondly however, the North-South divide means that Southern European states have been 
taking two rather contradictory steps. Their need for financial and technical assistance to secure 
their external borders has led them to support supranational policies and to apply for financial 
assistance from the available funds. However, even where there has been substantial EU 
assistance to reform national practices, there is still a sense that national interests prevail. 
Moreno Fuentes (2008) discussing the Spanish case for example suggests that there is a marked 
dissonance between rhetoric and practice. This might suggest that even where evidence of 
Europeanization can be found in terms of discourse and institutional adaptation; it does not 
necessarily translate into practice. This would also explain why the Southern EU states have 
also engaged in bilateral activity (Mode IV) in concluding agreements on migration control 
with third countries such as Spain and Portugal through the Seahorse network and the Italy-
Libya agreements, which even if funded partially by the EU, resemble mode four of foreign 
policy-making. The section also suggested that despite a history of opposition to many of its 
proposals in this area, the Commission was carefully developing a successful framing tactic for 
more supranational integration through funding for the development and procurement of 
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security technologies. The EUROSUR project would represent a considerable step forward in 
this respect, but remains ethically problematic. Kaunert (2010) argued that the Commission 
had also attempted to reframe asylum issues through an international law framework. This 
stance has since been largely rejected by member states, but the Commission’s attempts to 
frame external border management as technical rather than political seemed more successful at 
least prior to the intensification of the refugee crisis in 2015. 
 
[A] Counter-terrorism and Internal Security: Policy Change    
The interplay between the EU institutions and the member states in terms of shaping the 
external dimension of counter-terrorism and internal security policy is complex. While 
countering political extremism was the original issue that prompted intergovernmental 
cooperation in JHA, formal counter-terrorist cooperation was not really pursued at the EU level 
until after 9/11. Since then the external dimension of AFSJ counter-terrorism action has 
evolved quickly, sometimes through specific AFSJ policy instruments, sometimes through 
CFSP.  
Once again it is difficult to identify a constant grouping of states due to the high levels of 
politicization of the policy area and the domestic political imperative to need to be seen to 
respond to terrorist attacks. There are various cleavages along which member states fall. Firstly, 
states with higher or lower levels of concern about the balance between human rights and 
security. Most EU proposals have been focussed on security and there has been reasonably 
constant reluctance from the Nordic states and the Netherlands about impairing civil liberties. 
More Atlanticist states like the UK and Poland have been keener to follow an agenda that has 
been largely set by a third state, the United States (Monar, 2012). Secondly, there is a divide 
between those states with high levels of competence and experience in counter-terrorism, and 
those that do not. The former, largely the UK and France, are more likely to try to upload their 
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national priorities to the EU level, but paradoxically can be quite resistant to any 
supranationalization of counter-terrorism because they fear the result would be less effective 
than their national processes and could damage intelligence-sharing with third states. With the 
less capable the situation is reversed.  
This section intends to make two main claims about the nature of the process since 2001. 
Firstly, the European Commission has been able to act as a supranational policy entrepreneur 
on various issues and has been able to achieve agreement on previously intractable issues 
(Mode I). However, the Commission’s agenda has been largely shaped by a non-EU state, the 
US. Secondly, large Member States have been reasonably successful at uploading geographical 
preferences for external EU counter-terrorist activity (Mode II). Britain and France have been 
notable in this respect. Active member states however, tend also to maintain bilateral activity 
in the form of extra-EU security and intelligence policy relations (Mode IV) with third states. 
Let us examine each of these claims in turn. 
[A] Counter-terrorism and Internal Security: Policy Performance    
Firstly, external cooperation on counter-terrorism has evolved rapidly as a policy field since 
2001. In particular, the EU and its member states, as close allies and trading partners of the US, 
had to respond to the demands of its post 9/11 security agenda not just in terms of 
counterterrorism cooperation in third countries, but also to American efforts to secure its 
borders. Rees and Aldrich (2005) argue that strategic cultures related to terrorism are very 
different on both sides of the Atlantic. In contrast to the US which declared a global war on 
terror, EU states have tended to view counterterrorism as a matter of law enforcement and 
internal security rather than a military matter. This attitude seems to persist even after major 
attacks on Paris and Brussels in 2015-16. The more legalistic European approach meant that 
US policies like extraordinary rendition and Guantanamo Bay were controversial (Archick, 
2011). Attitudes to citizens’ rights on electronic surveillance and private data protection also 
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differ between the US and EU (Rees and Aldrich, 2005). These differences have emerged 
particularly in European Parliament opposition to some Commission proposals. 
However, some commentators suggest that EU-US stances on counter-terrorism have now 
converged. In part, some suggest this is due to the more multilateral approach of the second 
Bush administration and later the Obama administration, which has reacted to EU civil rights 
concerns, particularly about the treatment of detainees (Archick, 2011). Others however stress 
the Commission’s actions as a supranational policy entrepreneur. They point to the use that the 
Commission made of the shock of 9/11 to push for a rapid transfer of internal security powers 
to the EU level; something that Member States had traditionally been cautious about. The need 
for the EU to be seen to be doing something to assist the US on counter-terrorism, meant that 
measures which had earlier been proposed but not agreed were swiftly accepted.  
This speed meant that the EU’s emerging internal security policies were partially, if not 
primarily, constructed in response to the US’ need for transatlantic cooperation (Lodge, 2004; 
Pawlak, 2009). Archick (2011) points particularly to the EU internal security strategy, which 
resembles the US homeland security concept, while Lodge (2004) considers the Commission’s 
adoption of homeland security measures to be driven by subservience to the US rather than by 
internal imperatives. In this sense, we can observe the rapid emergence of a highly 
institutionalized, integrated policy area driven by a supranational actor, but shaped or framed 
by a third party. However, it is questionable whether the member states would have accepted 
this action had it not been for the external shocks of 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, 
and the importance that most attach to their bilateral relationships with the US. Monar (2012) 
argues that the UK was active in pressing for greater EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation. 
Moreover, there are signs that the period of the EU acting as a fairly unified actor on counter-
terrorism are over. The European Parliament is emerging as a more liberal (albeit very 
inconsistently) actor than the Commission and Council, and has made its concerns about 
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internal security policy clear, particularly regarding data protection.5 The Parliament also raised 
concerns about and demanded revisions to EU-US agreements on the transfer of banking data 
(Swift Accord) and air passenger data (Passenger Name Record) (Archick, 2011). Brady (2010) 
suggests that in the post Lisbon era the Parliament’s new right of co-decision means that such 
clashes will occur more frequently. 
The second contention is that some Member States have been successful in uploading their 
geographical preferences for external counter-terrorism action, but simultaneously maintain 
bilateral extra-EU cooperation, suggesting that integration is rather limited. The states which 
have been able to upload preferences are usually large states, which have special interests in 
and thus more intense engagement with particular regions for historical reasons. Ironically, 
given its reluctance on AFSJ integration, one of the most successful uploaders has been the 
UK. Quite apart from its success in fostering intensive EU-US cooperation, Mackenzie (2012) 
points out that the UK has made consistent and eventually successful efforts to upload its own 
policy conviction that Afghanistan and Pakistan are important sources of terrorist insecurity to 
the EU level. It was also successful in shaping the 2012 draft Counter-Terrorism Action Plan 
for Yemen and the Horn of Africa, leading the House of Commons to question whether other 
member states actually share what appeared to be a UK-Danish vision (House of Commons, 
2012). Similarly, France and Spain have been able to upload their particular concerns about the 
Maghreb.  
However, this uploading can be secondary to national action. Although the UK has attempted 
successfully to upload its preference for counter-terrorism action in Pakistan, partly because it 
enables it to encourage action that is not enmeshed in ex-colonial tensions, it also maintains 
close bilateral relations (Mackenzie, 2012). This is not unusual. Despite France and Spain 
successfully uploading Morocco and Algeria as EU policy priorities, both North African 
countries prefer bilateral relations with EU states. Moreover, despite the intensity of EU-US 
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cooperation, in 2008 Germany signed a bilateral agreement with the US on access to biometric 
data and the sharing of data on known and suspected terrorists (Monar, 2012). 
To sum up this section, the pattern of integration in the external dimension of EU counter-
terrorism policy is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, there has been a rapid expansion of 
integration sponsored by the European Commission, which could be viewed as evidence of 
mode one type foreign policy-making; that is external policy-making operating within the 
EU framework in an institutionalized, integrated and supranational fashion. However, this 
neglects the fact that there was an upload of Member States’ preferences for close cooperation 
with the US, and the fact that the Commission largely responded subsequently to a US agenda. 
The opposition of the Parliament to some measures regarding data sharing shows the extent of 
the mismatch between EU and US cultures. This means that the Commission counter-terrorism 
agenda sits uneasily and may as a result be less effectively downloaded into national cultures. 
It is hard to describe this as authentic Europeanization. 
Moreover, in a counterbalancing trend there is evidence that bilateralism is thriving as 
individual member states negotiate counter-terrorism agreements without reference to the EU, 
which fits well with the model of Mode IV (extra-EU policy relations) foreign policy-
making. This is coupled with evidence of Mode II; intergovernmentalism. In this sense, 
while member states’ abilities to upload their geographical preferences for counter-terrorism 
activities, reinforces Europeanization, it simultaneously reinforces national policy-making 
dynamics. 
  
[A] Conclusion 
The conclusion to this chapter will attempt to answer two questions;  
 Is the external dimension of the AFSJ becoming more Europeanized or more 
nationalized over time? 
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 What is the dominant mode of member state cooperation in this area and is this 
changing? 
From the outset of JHA cooperation the external border has been portrayed as threatening and 
needing to be secured through cooperation with third states. While elements of the external 
dimension of AFSJ are closer to the general objectives of the CFSP, such as the global 
promotion of human rights, international judicial cooperation or efforts to improve data 
protection standards in third countries, much of the external dimension of the AFSJ is about 
securing the external borders, and persuading third states to cooperate in this through the 
provision of financial and technical assistance. The complexity of the number of policy 
elements involved, and the mixed messages being conveyed by the EU institutions, have 
potentially limited the potential for downloading the field’s policy objectives to the member 
state level.  
Attempts by the Commission to act as a supranational policy entrepreneur have seen various 
re-framings of AFSJ; adopting a US agenda in the early 2000s when the emphasis was on 
counter-terrorism, in the late 2000s through a framing of the external border in terms of human 
rights and international law (Kaunert, 2010), and most recently by framing external border 
security as a technical rather than a political issue. Despite the Commission’s efforts to offer 
an overarching narrative, the external dimension of AFSJ remains predominantly reactive 
rather than proactive. While there has been a high level of activity in this field since the 1999 
Tampere European Council summit, external events rather than internal imperatives have been 
the agents of change. The policy-making mode associated with the early JHA cooperation was 
intensive transgovernmentalism. While the particularities of the second pillar have been 
superseded by the Treaty of Lisbon, their legacy is still present.  
This means that in terms of this book this foreign policy-making field can best be characterized 
as still more nationalized that Europeanized. Unpacking the external dimension of the AFSJ 
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has shown that in the absence of real agreement on the correct strategies for the EU to take in 
terms of controlling illegal migration and counter-terrorism, action tends to come through 
reaction to emergencies such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the refugee crisis currently 
impacting Europe. This reactive tendency allowed a third state, the USA, to frame the emerging 
EU counter-terrorism strategy. Member states do upload their own preferences and are able to 
frame policies in their national policy-making style. Particular examples are the French EU 
Presidency in 2008 uploading its national preferences to the European Pact on Asylum and 
Migration, the 2002 Spanish EU Presidency achieving its national goal of externalising JHA 
towards the Mediterranean. However, member states, who are particularly concerned about a 
particular issue with a third state, remain prone to concluding bilateral agreements. In short, in 
terms of this book’s analytical framework the dominant modes of member state cooperation 
are intergovernmentalism within the EU framework (Mode II) and extra-EU cooperation 
between EU and non-EU states (Mode IV). 
The European Commission is striving to create a joined-up narrative for the external dimension 
of AFSJ, and has made several attempts to frame it in an acceptable manner for the member 
states to accept supranationalism in this area. However, the high level of domestic sensitivity 
of the policy area and the lack of agreement on basic principles means the member states tend 
to block. The EUROSUR integrated border management project represents a step forward, but 
is controversial and raises both legal and ethical issues, which could undermine other areas of 
EU foreign policy. 
It is not possible to consistently classify states as laggards or lead states on the external 
dimension of AFSJ. One would expect Denmark, Ireland and the UK given their legal opt-outs, 
to be laggards. In fact though, the UK in particular, has been quite activist in pushing for 
external action on counter-terrorism, and although as a non-Schengen member it cannot be a 
member of Frontex, it attends meetings by invitation and has been a strong supporter of and 
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participant in Frontex operations. Moreover, the North-South divide seen in border 
management policy does not apply to counter-terrorism. Support and dissent tend to be issue-
specific and based on national interests. The issues that AFSJ tackles are too domestically 
sensitive across the EU for politicians to act otherwise. As the changes in policy-making 
adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon bed down, more established coalitions of supporters and 
laggards may emerge. As the issues at stake tend to be closely connected to fundamental rights, 
the coalitions may emerge though as party political rather than national. At present though, 
policy-making on the external dimension of the AFSJ remains predominantly 
intergovernmental, reactive rather than proactive and without clear guiding objectives other 
than internal security. 
 
 
 
1 The Treaty of Lisbon while extending the legal possibilities for ASFJ external action, also restricts them by 
emphasising in Article 4(2) TEU that member states have sole responsibility for maintaining law and order and 
national security. See Monar (2012) for a full account of this.  
2 Such as the Edinburgh 1992 European Council, which established principles governing external aspects of 
migration policy, in particular the intention to establish readmission agreements with third countries, and on 
coordinated action to address ‘push’ factors encouraging irregular migration into the EU. 
3 There is also a long-standing North-South divide more generally in terms of immigration policy. In the 1990s 
Northern states would put pressure on Southern states to adopt stricter immigration policies (King, Lazarides and 
Tsardanides, 2000). 
4 EU Internal Security Strategy:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/113055.pdf  
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